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Abstract
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Combining two unique data sets, this paper explores 
the relationship between the relative importance of 
different financial institutions and their average size 
and firms’ access to financial services. Specifically, the 
authors explore the relationship between the share in 
total financial assets and average asset size of banks, low-
end financial institutions, and specialized lenders, on the 
one hand, and firms’ access to and use of deposit and 
lending services, on the other hand. Two findings stand 
out. First, the dominance of banks in most developing 
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and emerging markets is associated with lower use of 
financial services by firms of all sizes. Low-end financial 
institutions and specialized lenders seem particularly 
suited to ease access to finance in low-income countries. 
Second, there is no evidence that smaller institutions are 
better in providing access to finance. To the contrary, 
larger specialized lenders and larger banks might actually 
ease small firms’ financing constraints, but only at low 
levels of gross domestic product per capita.  
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1.  Introduction 
The structure of the financial system is again in the headlines. Moving beyond the questions of 
banks vs. markets, policy makers are looking for advice on which kind of financial institutions 
and which market structures serve best in pushing out the access frontier. Which institutions are 
best suited to expand financial services to low-end customers, including small and medium-sized 
enterprises? Are these banks which can exploit scale and technological capacity, or specialized 
lenders, such as leasing or factoring companies which can offer expertise in tailored lending 
products, or low-end financial institutions which are closest to customers? Similarly, are small or 
large financial institutions better in serving low-end customers? On the one hand, large 
institutions can exploit scale economies and better diversify risks; on the other hand, small 
institutions might have better local market knowledge and flatter hierarchies, both of which 
facilitate serving low-end customers.  
Combining two unique data sets, this paper explores the relationship between the 
importance of different financial institutions, including low-end financial institutions, specialized 
lenders and banks, as well as the average size of these institutions and firms’ access to financial 
services, including account and lending services. In addition, we explore the potential 
heterogeneity of these relationships both across countries at different levels of economic 
development, across industries with different needs for external finance and across firms of 
different sizes, thus taking into account the different needs and capacities of countries in 
supporting different financial structure, different constraints of firms of different sizes and 
different needs for external finance across different industries.  
The relationship between financial structure, the average size of different financial 
institutions and access to finance is a critical question for policy makers. Access to financial 
services, especially by small and medium-sized enterprises, has become critical in many 
developing countries. Small and medium-sized enterprises make up a large part of the emerging 
private sector in most countries, but are also more constrained in their access to financial services 
than large firms (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 2005). While micro-finance has helped alleviate access to finance by the poor by 
adapting specific lending techniques such as group lending, it seems less conducive to easing 
financing constraints of more formal and larger enterprises.  More recently, specific financing 3 
 
forms such as leasing or factoring have been promoted as conducive to easing financing 
constraints of SMEs, as they are based on the underlying assets and cash flows rather than 
borrowers’ financial history (Berger and Udell, 2006). On the other hand, banks, particularly 
large banks, have also shown increased interest in SME financing, exploiting scale economies 
and technology (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2011a). The question on the size of 
financial institutions – often intertwined with the ownership question – is directly related to entry 
barriers and minimum capital requirements imposed by policy makers in developing countries to 
foster a specific market structure (Beck et al., 2011b; Beck et al., 2011c and World Bank, 2011).  
This paper uses a unique and confidential dataset to shed light on the relationship 
between the structure of the financial system and the size of its institutions, on the one hand, and 
access to financial services by enterprises, on the other hand.  Specifically, using data from the 
World Bank and IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), we are able to compute 
both the relative importance of different segments of the financial system that cater to low-end 
customers, such as small and medium-size enterprises, as well as the average size of institutions 
within this segment.  We then match these country-level indicators to firm-level indicators from 
the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys on financing obstacles and actual use of deposit and loan 
services by enterprises in developing and emerging countries. In addition, we examine the 
relationship between financial structure and firms’ access to finance across countries at different 
levels of GDP per capita, across firms of different sizes, and across industries with different 
needs of external finance, to thus take explicitly into account the potential cross-county, cross-
firm and cross-industry heterogeneity in the effect of financial structure on firms’ access to 
finance. 
Our research speaks to several literatures. First, the financial structure literature has 
discussed the implications of bank- vs. market-based financial systems for firm, industry and 
GDP per capita growth
2, but has not considered the importance of other segments of the financial 
system, including specialized lenders such as leasing, finance or factoring companies or low-end 
financial institutions such as cooperatives, credit unions and microfinance institutions. This 
paper is the first, to our knowledge, that explores the relationship between the importance of 
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these two segments focused on SME lending, for access to finance by enterprises. Theory and 
literature offer different predictions on the effect of importance of these segments on firms’ 
access to finance. On the one hand, specialized lenders can exploit their expertise in specific 
lending products such as leasing and factoring to improve firms’ access to external finance. 
Similarly, low-end financial institutions might have an advantage in working with smaller and 
less formal enterprises than banks, as they are closer to the client and might have more adequate 
organizational structures, such as flat hierarchies, and lending techniques, such as group 
lending.
3  On the other hand, banks have a larger scale and technical capacity to cater to a large 
number of low-end clients (De la Torre, Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2010).  They might be 
therefore in a better position to invest in technology and risk management systems than other 
financial institutions.  
Second, our research speaks to a large literature on the effects of the size of financial 
institutions on firms’ access to financial services (Berger, Hasan and Klapper, 2004). This 
literature has focused mostly on the size of banks, but has not come to an unambiguous result.  
On the one hand, smaller banks might be closer to the client and can use relationship lending to 
effectively serve small and medium-sized enterprises.  On the other hand, larger banks might 
have an advantage in using transaction-based lending techniques such as leasing or factoring. 
While this literature has focused on banks, we expand it to consider the relationship between the 
average size of low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders and access to finance by 
enterprises.  Similar arguments as for banks can be made for non-bank institutions.  On the one 
hand, smaller institutions might be closer to the client; on the other hand, larger institutions 
might serve these clients more effectively by exploiting their scale.  
Our results suggest that the dominance by banks in most financial systems of developing 
markets is associated with lower use of financial services by firms of all sizes. To the contrary, a 
larger share of low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders is associated with higher use 
of financial services in low-income, but not necessarily in middle-income countries. Large 
financial institutions, on the other hand, are not necessarily associated with lower use of financial 
services. To the contrary, larger specialized lenders and larger banks might actually ease small 
firms’ financing constraints, while large low-end financial institutions seem to impede access to 
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financial institutions only for medium-sized and large enterprises. And larger low-end financial 
institutions might actually be better in easing access to finance in low-income countries.  
Before proceeding, an important caveat is due. Our results derive from cross-sectional 
variation across countries and although we control for an array of firm and country 
characteristics, we can therefore not completely exclude the possibility of omitted variable bias. 
We mitigate this concern, however, by testing for the differential relationship between financial 
structure and average size of financial institutions, on the one hand, and access to external 
finance by firms in countries at different levels of GDP per capita, firms of different sizes and 
firms in industries with different financing needs. It is important to stress, however, that we do 
not interpret our findings as causal relationships.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the data 
sources and variables we use.  Section 3 presents methodology and section 4 our results. Section 
5 concludes.  
2.  Data 
We use data from two main sources to construct our sample. We use the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) reports, which are jointly prepared by the IMF and World Bank
4, to 
construct our measures of the importance and average size of different segments of the financial 
system and firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys to measure firms’ access 
to and use of financial services. Since there is limited overlap between the two datasets, we end 
up with a total of 54 sample countries and up to 50 countries per regressions.  All our countries 
are developing or emerging countries, with 19 countries in Europe and Central Asia, 10 countries 
in Latin America, 23 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 2 countries in East Asia and Pacific. 
The level of economic development, as measured by GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD), 
varies significantly across our sample countries, ranging from 134 USD in Malawi to 7,229 USD 
in Uruguay.  
Established in 1999, the FSAP is a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of a country’s 
financial sector. Historically, full FSAP updates take place about every four to seven years in any 
                                                            
4 To be exact, FSAP is a joint undertaking of the World Bank and the IMF in developing and emerging market 
countries and of the IMF alone in advanced economies. 6 
 
given country. Among other things, the reports generally include a table that reports on the 
country’s financial structure broken down into institutional categories such as banks or pension 
funds. The aggregation level of institutional categories varies across reports. There is no 
standardized categorization of institutions; while one report may have “banks” as one 
institutional category, another report may have “private banks” and “state-owned banks” as 
institutional categories instead, which combined would be equivalent to the category “banks” in 
the former report. The table typically provides the following information for each institutional 
category: number of institutions, assets in (mostly) local currency units, assets as a percentage of 
total financial sector assets and assets as percentage of GDP. Note that not all reports report data 
in all four categories and while reports generally include a couple of years of historic data they 
may record data in one category for one year but not the next and often data just for one or two 
years are reported.
5 Using this financial structure information, we build a database from all 
financial structure information reported in table form in FSAP reports from the beginning of the 
program until mid 2009. 
For some countries, more than one FSAP report is available. Unfortunately, the reporting 
structure is almost never the same as in the previous report(s) for the same country and cross-
checks of the data revealed that the reported information is not even necessarily consistent across 
reports for the same country. We therefore assume that the most recent report contains the most 
accurate information and only keep observations from the most recent report available. Our final 
database consists of an unbalanced panel for 89 countries over the years 1995-2008. We convert 
any variables in local currency units into 2000 constant US dollars using exchange rates from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
While we have data available for a broader array of institutions, we focus on three types.  
First, low-end financial institutions which include credit unions, building societies, community 
banks, cooperatives, microfinance institutions, cash lenders, mutual banks, postal banks, rural 
banks, savings and loans institutions, and thrift banks. This category is supposed to capture non-
bank institutions that serve the low-end of the market, including small and medium-sized 
enterprises. Second, specialized non-bank financial institutions which comprise – among others – 
finance companies, factoring companies, banks specialized in housing, merchant banks, and 
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special credit institutions. This category is supposed to capture non-bank financial institutions 
that specialize in certain lending activities that might be more attractive for small and medium-
sized enterprises, such as leasing and factoring. The final category is deposit-taking or 
commercial banks.  
We use the FSAP data to construct two indicators. The asset share is calculated as each 
type’s assets relative to the sum of low-end financial institutions, specialized non-bank financial 
institutions and commercial bank financial assets gauges the importance of each segment within 
the financial system by dividing the total assets of each category by total financial assets of these 
three segments in the country. The three asset shares add up to 100.
6 The average size is 
computed by dividing the total amount of assets per category by the number of institutions per 
category. 
Both indicators vary widely across our sample countries. The share of banks varies from 
almost 99% in Ukraine to 61% in Colombia. The share of specialized lenders varies from 38% in 
Colombia to less than one percent in Senegal, Ukraine, Bolivia, and Madagascar.  The share of 
low-end financial institutions varies from 21% in Burkina Faso to less than one-half percent in 
Chile and Latvia.  The average size of banks in USD ranges from 3.5 billion in Turkey to 10 
million in Guinea-Bissau. The average size of specialized lenders varies from 350 million USD 
in Chile to less than one million in Mongolia. The average size of low-end financial institutions 
varies from 800 million in Turkey to less than one million in Mongolia.  
We combine the financial structure data with data from the World Bank/IFC Enterprise 
Surveys. The Enterprise Surveys collect firm level-data from key manufacturing and service 
sectors in over 120 countries since 2002.
7 Countries are surveyed every three to four years but 
not simultaneously. To ensure data consistency and inter-country comparability we only use data 
from countries in the standardized dataset 2006-2010 which contains data for 100 countries.
8 The 
number of firms surveyed in each country depends on the size of the economy with more firms 
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being surveyed in larger economies and is chosen to make each country’s sample representative 
of the non-agricultural private economy. 
From the Enterprise Survey we construct the following four access to and use of financial 
services indicators:  (i) access to finance is an indicator variable ranging from 1-5 with 1 
indicating access to finance is “no obstacle” to the operation of firm to  5 indicating a “very 
severe obstacle”; (ii) account is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an account at the 
time of the survey and zero otherwise; (iii) overdraft is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm 
has an overdraft facility at the time of the survey and zero otherwise; (iv) loan is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm has a line of credit or loan from a financial institution at the time 
of survey and zero otherwise. 
We match the two samples by building a cross-sectional dataset that matches the firm 
characteristics with the average of the available data from the FSAP reports. Maximum country 
overlap between the two data sources is 54 countries with over 25,000 firm level observations. 
Appendix Table A1 lists the countries in our sample, a breakdown of the firm distribution by 
country, and by-country summary statistics of the FSAP variables we will use in the subsequent 
analysis. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and Table 2 correlations on the country-level. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that over 90% of firms in our sample have an 
account. This percentage, however, varies significantly across countries. While in the Slovak 
Republic, 20.8% of firms have an account, 99.8% do so in Croatia.  Almost 50% of firms have 
an overdraft facility and 45% have a loan. Behind this average, however, are again large cross-
country variations. While only 1.3% of firms have an overdraft facility and 3.1% a loan in 
Guinea-Bissau, 87.5% and 74.5%, respectively, do so in Chile.  
We also use information from the Enterprise Surveys to control for firm-level 
characteristics that might affects a firm’s ease of access to financial products. In particular, we 
construct dummy variables for firm size (small, up to 19 employees; medium, 20-99 employees; 
large, 100 or more employees), being a subsidiary, and being publicly listed, and control for the 
percentage of the firm owned by private foreign owners and the percentage of a firm owned by 
the state, as well as the firm’s age. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that 47.4% of all 
firms are small, 34.3% are medium-sized and 18.3% large. 13% are subsidiaries of other firms, 9 
 
and 6.2% are publicly listed. The foreign ownership share is, on average, 10.7%, while the 
average government ownership is 0.7%. On average, firms are 17.5 years old. 
Finally, we control for industry-level variation in the need for external finance. 
Specifically, we use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator on the fraction of investment that 
cannot be financed through internal cash flows, computed over the 1980s for listed firms in the 
U.S. The underlying assumption in Rajan and Zingales and our work is that for technological 
reasons some industries depend more heavily on external finance than others and that this 
industry variation does not differ across countries. We use the self-reported industry 
categorization by firms in the Enterprise Surveys to match with the Rajan and Zingales 
classification. Since this variable is only available for manufacturing industries, we lose about a 
half of our sample. The average fraction of external need for finance across our sample is 0.29, 
varying from -0.45 (tobacco) to 1.14 (plastic products). 
The correlations in Table 2 suggest that there is no systematic relationship between the 
country-level metrics of financial segment size. Not surprisingly, however, the average asset size 
of some of the institutional categories is positively and significantly correlated.  The log of GDP 
per capita is, as expected, positively and significantly correlated with the mean asset size of all 
institutional categories except low-end NBFIs. There are no significant correlations between the 
asset shares of the different segments of the financial system and access to finance.  There are, 
however, significant correlations between the average size of financial institutions and access to 
finance. Countries with larger banks have a higher share of firms with loans and overdraft and 
firms that complain less about financing obstacles. Countries with larger specialized lenders also 
have more firms with overdraft facilities or loans. Many of the firm characteristics are also 
correlated with each other. Countries with more small firms, for instance, have fewer listed and 
younger firms. Our access indicators are also significantly correlated with our industry indicator 
of external dependence, with firms in industries more reliant on external finance reporting lower 
financing obstacles and a higher probability of having an account, a loan or an overdraft. 10 
 
3.  Methodology 
To estimate the effect of the mean asset size and assets as share of total assets of different types 
of financial institutions on obstacles to and the use of financial services we use the following 
empirical baseline specification: 
Financial Servicesij =  + 1 Medium Firmij + 2 Large Firmij + 3 Subsidiaryij  
   + 4 Public Firmij + 5 Foreign-Ownedij  + 6 State-Ownedij  
   + 7 Firm Ageij + 8 Firm Sectorij + 9 GDP per capitaj  
   + 10 Financial Sector Indicatorj + eij 
where Financal Services indicates one of our four dependent variables measuring access to and 
use of financial services of firm i in country j. Because our dependent variables have different 
data structures, we use different and data-structure appropriate econometric models to estimate 
the effect on each. We use ordered probit when the dependent variable is access to finance and 
probit when it is account, overdraft, or loan. Financial Sector Indicator is our independent 
variable of interest that varies across regressions: average size or assets as share of financial 
sector assets per the institutional categories low-end financial institutions, specialized lenders, 
and banks.  Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all specifications so that we allow 
for correlation of error terms across firms within a country but not across countries. It is 
important to note that our regressions imply empirical associations, but not necessarily causality.  
In a second step, we want to assess whether the relationship between financial structure 
and access to financial services varies across countries with different levels of economic 
development, across firms of different sizes and across industries with different needs for 
external finance.  We therefore interact, in separate regressions, the Financial Sector Indicator 
with GDP per capita, with dummy variables indicating that the firm is small, medium or large 
size, or with the Rajan and Zingales (1998) indicator of external dependence. In the case of 
interactions with size dummies, we do not include the financial service indicator by itself, while 
in the case of interaction regressions with external dependence we include both external 
dependence and its interaction with the financial service indicator. Since Ai and Norton (2003) 11 
 
have shown that it might be difficult to interpret the marginal effects of interaction terms in non-
linear models, we run these regressions with OLS. 
4.  Results 
Tables 3 and 5 report our main results using Asset Share and Average Size as financial sector 
indicators, respectively, while Tables 4 and 6 report the regressions with interaction terms.  In 
the case of Tables 4 and 6, Panel A reports the coefficient estimates, while Panel B reports the 
partial effects at the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of GDP per capita and the external dependence 
ratio. In the interest of space and readability, we report regression coefficients of all variables in 
Table 3, while in all subsequent tables report just the coefficients of interest, namely the 
coefficients of the Financial Sector Indicator and interaction terms. Due to data limitations on 
the average size variables the country sample and the number of firms do not stay constant across 
specifications in Tables 5 and 6.
9 
4.1  Asset Share across Different Segments 
The results in Table 3 suggest that there is a marginally positive relationship between the 
importance of low-end financial institutions or specialized lenders and firms’ access to financial 
services. Specifically, firms in countries with a larger share of low-end financial institutions are 
more likely to have an account or a loan and firms in countries with a higher share of specialized 
lenders are more likely to have an overdraft, though these relationships are significant only at the 
10% level. We also find that a larger share of banks in total financial assets is associated with 
lower use of financial services by enterprises. The share of bank assets in total financial assets 
enters negatively and significantly at the 10% level in the regression of overdraft and negatively 
and significantly at the 5% level in the regression of loans.  None of the financial sector shares is 
significantly associated with financing obstacles.  
The coefficient estimates on our control variables are largely as expected and hold across 
the three categories of financial institutions. Firms in countries with higher GDP per capita as 
well as medium and large firms are more likely to have an account, overdraft facility, and loan 
and report fewer obstacles to access to finance. Firms that are subsidiaries are more likely to 
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have an account and an overdraft facility, while there appears to be no significant relationship 
between a firm being publicly listed and its access to and use of financial services. As the 
percentage of foreign ownership in a firm increases firms are less likely to encounter obstacles to 
access to finance and are more likely to have an account. However, they are also less likely to 
have to have a loan. Firms are also less likely to have a loan as the percentage of state ownership 
in a firm increases suggesting that in both cases alternative financing options might be available 
to such firms. Finally, the older firms are the more likely they are to have an account and 
overdraft facility.   
The results of Table 4 show that the relationship between the importance of low-end 
financial institutions, specialized lenders and access to finance varies significantly across 
countries. While the asset share of low-end financial institutions enters positively and 
significantly in the regressions of financing obstacles, account and overdraft, its interaction with 
GDP per capita enters negatively and significantly. When we calculate the partial effects (Panel 
B) for the share of low-end financial institutions at the 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th percentile of GDP per 
capita in our sample we find that there is no statistically significant relation between the share of 
low-end financial institutions and financing obstacles for countries at the 25
th percentile of GDP 
per capita (equivalent to the GDP per capita of Mongolia). However, there is a significantly 
negative relation at the 50
th and 75
th percentile of GDP per capita (equivalent to the GDP per 
capita of Guatemala and Brazil, respectively). When we look at the outcome of having an 
account or a loan only the partial effect for countries at the 25
th percentile of GDP per capita is 
significant and positive, while the relation between the share of low-end financial institutions and 
the share of firms with overdraft is not significant at any level of GDP per capita.  Firms in 
countries with a higher share of low-end financial institutions thus report lower financing 
obstacles only in lower-middle and middle-income countries, while they benefit – in terms of 
better access to financial services – only in low-income countries.  
Neither the level of the share of specialized financial institutions nor its interaction with 
GDP per capita enters significantly. The partial effects calculations in Panel B suggest that the 
importance of specialized financial institutions has no statistically significant impact except in 
the case of overdrafts for countries at the 50
th percentile of GDP per capita where the impact is 
significant and positive. Finally, the relationship between banks’ importance and firms’ use of 13 
 
overdrafts and loans is negative and significant only in countries at the 25
th and 50
th percentile of 
GDP per capita.  The negative effect of bank dominance is thus concentrated in low and lower-
middle income countries.   
When interacting the relative importance of different segments of the financial system 
with the external dependence across different sectors, the interaction term suggests that a more 
prominent role of low-end financial institutions reduces financing obstacles for industries that 
rely more on external finance. The percentile calculations, however, indicate that combined with 
the level effect there is no significant relationship. None of the other interaction terms of asset 
share with external dependence, enters significantly at the 5% level, suggesting that the 
relationship between the relative size of different segments of the financial system and access to 
finance by enterprises does not vary across sectors with different needs for external finance.  
When interacting the financial sector indicators with firm size dummies, we cannot find 
any significant relationship between the relative importance of low-end financial institutions or 
specialized lenders and access to finance and no differential effect across firms of different sizes, 
with one exception. Specifically, the likelihood of having an account increases with a higher 
share of low-end financial institutions for medium and large firms, while none of the other firm-
size interactions enters significantly at the 5% level. In the case of specialized lenders, the 
likelihood of having an overdraft is significant only for small and medium, but not for large 
firms.   Finally, we find that a more prominent role for banks is associated with a lower 
likelihood of obtaining an overdraft facility or loan for small and medium-sized firms, while the 
relationship is not significant at the 5% level for large firms.  
4.2  Average Size of Financial Institutions 
The Table 5 regressions suggest that smaller low-end financial institutions are associated with 
higher financing obstacles as reported by firms, but also a higher probability of having an 
account and a loan.  On the other hand, having larger specialized lenders is associated with a 
higher probability of having an overdraft facility and loan. The average size of banks, on the 
other hand, is not associated with access to finance. 14 
 
The coefficient estimates in the regression reported in Table 6 show a non-linear 
relationship between the average size of different financial institutions and access to finance 
across countries at different levels of GDP per capita, across firms of different sizes, and across 
different external financing needs. Larger low-end financial institutions are associated with lower 
financing obstacles and a higher likelihood of use of an overdraft facility across all countries 
although the partial effects diminish as the GDP per capita increases. While the coefficient on 
average size enters negatively (positively) and significantly, its interaction enters positively 
(negatively) and significantly in the regressions of financing obstacles (loans and overdrafts). 
Assessing the partial effects, we find that the average size of low-end institutions has a negative 
(positive) relationship with financing obstacles (likelihood of having an overdraft) at all levels of 
GDP per capita, but decreasingly so as we move up the ladder of economic development. The 
negative effect of average size is significant only for low and lower-middle-income countries in 
the case of loans.  We do not find any significant relationship between the average size of low-
end institutions and the likelihood of having an account at any level of GPD per capita.  The 
negative relationship of the average size of low-end financial institutions with financing 
obstacles and the use of accounts holds across firms of all sizes, though it is strongest for small 
enterprises. The negative relationship of the size of low-end financial institutions with the use of 
loans only holds for medium-sized and large enterprises. The interaction regressions with the 
external dependence variable suggest that the relationship between larger low-end financial 
institutions and the likelihood of receiving a loan is stronger in industries with a higher need for 
external financing. This relationship is significant at the 1% level for all three percentile 
calculations.  
A larger average size of specialized lenders continues to be positively associated with the 
likelihood of having an overdraft or loan across all countries, while there is no significant 
relation with financing obstacles and the use of accounts. This positive relationship holds for 
firms of all sizes and is strongest for small firms, with the exception of being insignificant for 
large firms in the loan column. The coefficient of the interaction term with the external 
dependence ratio is never significant suggesting there is no differential effect of the average size 
of specialized lenders across industries with different external financing needs. 15 
 
Larger banks are associated with lower financing obstacles in poorer countries (at the 25
th 
percentile level of GDP per capita), while the relationship turns insignificant in middle-income 
countries. Similarly, we find a positive relation of average size of banks with the likelihood of 
having an account at the 25
th and 50
th percentiles of GDP per capita, but not at the 75
th percentile. 
We also find evidence that larger banks are associated with a higher likelihood of overdrafts and 
loans for small firms, though the relationship with loans is significant only at the 10% level. The 
interaction with external finance is significant at the 5% level for likelihood of having an account 
and an overdraft facility. However, when combined with the level effect we see from the results 
in Table 6 Panel B that the overall effect of banks is insignificant across the different percentiles 
of the external dependence ratio.  
4.3  Robustness Tests 
In unreported robustness tests, we gauge the sensitivity of the interaction regressions of Tables 4 
and 6 to the estimation technique. Specifically, we find that our main findings hold when using 
non-linear estimation techniques as in Tables 3 and 5.  We also re-ran our financing obstacles 
regressions including dummy variables indicating whether a firm has an account, a loan or an 
overdraft. The loan dummy enters positively and significantly, consistent with findings by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008), but the results do not change.  
5.  Conclusions 
Using unique data on financial structure and the average size of different financial institutions, 
this paper explores the implications of the relative importance and average size of institutions 
that cater specifically to SMEs compared to the importance of banks and their average size. 
Our results indicate that the dominance of banks in the financial systems of most developing 
countries is rather detrimental for firms’ access to financial services. We do not find any 
evidence that smaller institutions – be they banks, specialized lenders or low-end financial 
institutions are better in providing access to finance for enterprises. Critically, however, we find 
that “one size does not fit all.” Low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders seem 
especially appropriate to ease access to finance in low-income countries. Similarly, larger low-
end financial institutions and banks seem to ease access to finance only at low levels of GDP per 16 
 
capita. We also find variation across firm sizes, not so much in the importance of different 
segments of the financial system, but rather in the relationship with the average size. We do not 
find that larger low-end financial institutions hurt small firms’ access to credit. Even more 
important, larger specialized lenders and banks are actually associated with a greater likelihood 
of loan and overdraft use by small firms.  We also find that some of our effects are stronger for 
industries more reliant on external finance.  
Our results, while tentative, send important policy messages. First, the dominance of banks in 
most financial systems across the developing world is indeed associated with the limited access 
to financial services by enterprises. This calls for diversification and more competition within the 
financial system, including from low-end financial institutions and specialized lenders. Second, 
smaller financial institutions are not necessarily better equipped to improve access to financial 
services by enterprises. While certainly not a call for consolidation, this again implies a 
diversified financial system with institutions of different sizes.  17 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                 
A. Firm-level Characteristics                
                 
Access to finance (1 no obstacle - 5 
very severe obstacle)  24228  2.72173  1.42283  1  5 
Dummy==1 if firm has account  24531  0.90445  0.29398  0  1 
Dummy==1 if firm has overdraft facility  23952  0.48910  0.49989  0  1 
Dummy==1 if firm has loan   24336  0.44740  0.49724  0  1 
Dummy==1 if firm size small  24659  0.47423  0.49935  0  1 
Dummy==1 if firm size medium  24659  0.34263  0.47460  0  1 
Dummy==1 if firm size large   24659  0.18314  0.38679  0  1 
Dummy==1 if subsidiary  24659  0.13046  0.33682  0  1 
Dummy==1 if publicly listed  24659  0.05746  0.23273  0  1 
% of firm owned by foreign investor  24659  10.72816  29.16649  0  100 
% of firm owned by government  24659  0.73624  6.90089  0  100 
Firm age in years  24659  17.51482  16.07393  0  310 
                 
B. Industry-level Characteristics                
                 
External dependence ratio  28  0.28714  0.36799  -0.45  1.14 
                 
C. Country-level Characteristics                
                 
GDP per capita (log)  54  6.96505  1.21735  4.89472  8.88592 
Mean asset size, low-end NBFI (in 
constant 2000 bn USD)  36  0.03224  0.13567  0.00001  0.81750 
Mean asset size, specialized NBFI (in 
constant 2000 bn USD)  33  0.05781  0.09034  0.00041  0.35550 
Mean asset size, banks (in constant 
2000 bn USD)  50  0.54188  0.76335  0.00993  3.46442 
Asset share, low-end NBFI (%)  33  4.38904  5.22834  0.05639  21.77177 
Asset share, specialized NBFI (%)  33  6.52460  7.59618  0.27273  38.08210 
Asset share, banks (%)  33  89.08637  8.56548  61.17335  98.89384 20 
 
Table 2: Correlations 
      1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  Access to finance  1.000                            
2  Account  -0.189  1.000                         
3  Overdraft facility  -0.219  0.344**  1.000                      
4  Loan   -0.499***  0.345**  0.673***  1.000                   
5  Dummy==1 if firm size small  0.527***  -0.267*  -0.440***  -0.710***  1.000                
6  Dummy==1 if firm size medium  -0.482***  0.248*  0.437***  0.627***  -0.888***  1.000             
7  Dummy==1 if firm size large   -0.468***  0.234*  0.359***  0.652***  -0.913***  0.623***  1.000          
8  Dummy==1 if subsidiary  0.002  0.276**  0.160  -0.112  -0.118  0.059  0.150  1.000       
9  Dummy==1 if publicly listed  -0.129  0.045  -0.027  0.205  -0.384***  0.382***  0.314**  -0.077  1.000    
10  % of firm owned by foreign investor  -0.017  0.124  -0.139  -0.372***  0.089  -0.076  -0.085  0.644***  -0.131  1.000 
11  % of firm owned by government  -0.023  0.030  -0.125  0.061  -0.131  -0.001  0.225  0.083  0.418***  -0.009 
12  Firm age in years  -0.286**  0.302**  0.604***  0.628***  -0.516***  0.508***  0.426***  0.160  0.144  -0.116 
13  External dependence ratio  -0.320**  0.278**  0.407***  0.383***  -0.520***  0.408***  0.522***  0.198  0.097  0.024 
14  GDP per capita (log)  -0.586***  0.176  0.416***  0.649***  -0.496***  0.359***  0.525***  0.123  -0.004  -0.041 
15  Asset share, low-end NBFI  0.114  0.158  0.032  -0.070  0.018  0.030  -0.056  0.038  -0.014  0.032 
16  Asset share, specialized NBFI  -0.106  -0.035  0.186  0.109  0.200  -0.078  -0.265  -0.228  -0.274  -0.064 
17  Asset share, banks  0.024  -0.065  -0.184  -0.054  -0.188  0.051  0.270  0.179  0.252  0.037 
18  Mean asset size, low-end NBFI  -0.272  -0.020  0.227  0.195  -0.242  0.143  0.253  -0.091  -0.141  -0.183 
19  Mean asset size, specialized NBFI  -0.080  0.198  0.536***  0.428**  -0.040  0.185  -0.078  0.066  -0.191  -0.178 
20  Mean asset size, banks  -0.385***  0.056  0.467***  0.481***  -0.413***  0.288**  0.435***  0.121  -0.193  -0.183 
      11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
12  Firm age in years  -0.019  1.000                         
13  External dependence ratio  0.022  0.348***  1.000                      
14  GDP per capita (log)  0.022  0.409***  0.427***  1.000                   
15  Asset share, low-end NBFI  -0.009  0.070  0.078  -0.267  1.000                
16  Asset share, specialized NBFI  0.021  -0.124  -0.034  0.158  -0.147  1.000             
17  Asset share, banks  -0.013  0.068  -0.017  0.023  -0.480***  -0.797***  1.000          
18  Mean asset size, low-end NBFI  -0.141  0.085  0.130  0.232  -0.088  -0.051  0.105  1.000       
19  Mean asset size, specialized NBFI  -0.310*  0.352**  0.137  0.502***  -0.311  0.575***  -0.302  -0.035  1.000    
20  Mean asset size, banks  -0.113  0.354**  0.440***  0.634***  -0.196  0.070  0.070  0.592***  0.506***  1.000 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                               
Correlations are at the country-level with firm-level variables averaged by country.                    21 
 













Account  Overdraft  Loan 
   oprobit  probit  probit  probit  oprobit  probit  probit  probit  oprobit  probit  probit  probit 
   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.195***  0.175**  0.357***  0.356***  -0.175***  0.141*  0.319***  0.318***  -0.174***  0.145**  0.349***  0.331*** 
   (0.059)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.053)  (0.063)  (0.072)  (0.083)  (0.050)  (0.061)  (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.049) 
Dummy==1 if firm size 
medium  -0.141***  0.471***  0.504***  0.505***  -0.145***  0.478***  0.526***  0.516***  -0.147***  0.482***  0.519***  0.516*** 
   (0.037)  (0.066)  (0.060)  (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.067)  (0.059)  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.040) 
Dummy==1 if firm size 
large   -0.294***  0.602***  0.715***  0.852***  -0.295***  0.609***  0.751***  0.868***  -0.301***  0.621***  0.744***  0.872*** 
   (0.052)  (0.122)  (0.104)  (0.069)  (0.053)  (0.121)  (0.103)  (0.069)  (0.055)  (0.117)  (0.107)  (0.070) 
Dummy==1 if subsidiary  -0.047  0.189**  0.184***  0.022  -0.046  0.201**  0.201***  0.031  -0.050  0.206**  0.200***  0.034 
   (0.060)  (0.096)  (0.066)  (0.043)  (0.061)  (0.094)  (0.061)  (0.042)  (0.059)  (0.094)  (0.062)  (0.042) 
Dummy==1 if publicly 
listed  0.038  -0.021  -0.032  0.116  0.040  -0.013  0.001  0.128  0.033  0.001  0.002  0.137* 
   (0.077)  (0.114)  (0.084)  (0.075)  (0.084)  (0.112)  (0.085)  (0.081)  (0.086)  (0.113)  (0.085)  (0.075) 
% of firm owned by 
foreign investor  -0.003***  0.003**  -0.001  -0.004***  -0.003***  0.003**  -0.001  -0.004***  -0.003***  0.003**  -0.001  -0.004*** 
   (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
% of firm owned by 
government  0.002  0.000  -0.002  -0.006***  0.002  -0.000  -0.003  -0.007***  0.002  -0.000  -0.003  -0.007*** 
   (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Firm age in years  -0.001  0.005***  0.005***  0.001  -0.002  0.005***  0.006***  0.002  -0.002  0.005***  0.005***  0.001 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
NBFI, low-end  -0.013  0.025*  0.006  0.015*                         
   (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.008)                         
NBFI, specialized              0.001  0.004  0.018*  0.007             
               (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.006)             
Banks                          0.003  -0.011  -0.017*  -0.010** 
                           (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.005) 22 
 
Constant     2.815***  -8.177***  1.049**     3.119***  -7.921***  1.365**     4.132***  -6.525***  2.250*** 
      (1.030)  (0.601)  (0.532)     (0.663)  (0.728)  (0.533)     (0.897)  (1.210)  (0.604) 
Cutpoint 1  -2.034***           -1.848***           -1.599*          
   (0.520)           (0.540)           (0.831)          
Cutpoint 2  -1.613***           -1.427***           -1.179          
   (0.509)           (0.530)           (0.821)          
Cutpoint 3  -1.041**           -0.857           -0.607          
   (0.513)           (0.534)           (0.822)          
Cutpoint 4  -0.382           -0.199           0.051          
   (0.514)           (0.534)           (0.822)          
N  17,708  17,879  17,542  17,686  17,708  17,879  17,542  17,686  17,708  17,879  17,542  17,686 
# countries  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared  0.020  0.083  0.131  0.124  0.019  0.076  0.139  0.124  0.019  0.080  0.140  0.126 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                  
Regressions include unreported industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.                      
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
         
 23 
 
Table 4 Panel A: Asset share and access to finance – cross-country and cross-firm heterogeneity 
   Access to Finance  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS     OLS  OLS     OLS 
   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se     coef/se  coef/se     coef/se 
NBFI, low-end  0.325***  -0.022     0.027**  0.003     0.092**  0.001     0.033     0.008** 
   (0.094)  (0.018)     (0.010)  (0.002)     (0.038)  (0.008)     (0.024)     (0.003) 
     x GDP per capita (log)  -0.053***        -0.004**        -0.014**        -0.004       
   (0.016)        (0.002)        (0.006)        (0.004)       
     x External Dependence     -0.033***        -0.001        -0.011        -0.008    
      (0.009)        (0.002)        (0.010)        (0.005)    
NBFI, low-end x small        -0.004        0.004        0.001        0.005* 
         (0.022)        (0.003)        (0.006)        (0.003) 
NBFI, low-end x medium        -0.026        0.004**        0.001        0.004 
         (0.020)        (0.002)        (0.008)        (0.003) 
NBFI, low-end x large        -0.035        0.005**        0.006        0.005 
         (0.022)        (0.002)        (0.009)        (0.005) 
N  17,708  10,070  17,708  17,883  10,166  17,883  17,544  9,973  17,544  17,690  10,050  17,690 
# countries  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
Adj. R-squared  0.082  0.054  0.061  0.050  0.038  0.047  0.181  0.174  0.169  0.160  0.155  0.159 
                                      
NBFI, specialized  -0.066  -0.001     -0.015  0.001     0.010  0.006***     0.019  0.004**    
   (0.054)  (0.005)     (0.011)  (0.001)     (0.027)  (0.002)     (0.020)  (0.002)    
     x GDP per capita (log)  0.009        0.002        -0.001        -0.002       
   (0.007)        (0.001)        (0.004)        (0.003)       
     x External Dependence     0.016*        0.001        0.000        -0.000    
      (0.008)        (0.002)        (0.004)        (0.002)    
NBFI, specialized x small        -0.003        0.000        0.007**        0.003 
         (0.005)        (0.002)        (0.003)        (0.002) 
NBFI, specialized x 
medium        0.007        0.000        0.006**        0.003* 24 
 
         (0.006)        (0.001)        (0.003)        (0.002) 
NBFI, specialized x large        0.002        0.000        0.002        0.000 
         (0.007)        (0.001)        (0.004)        (0.002) 
N  17,708  10,070  17,708  17,883  10,166  17,883  17,544  9,973  17,544  17,690  10,050  17,690 
# countries  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
Adj. R-squared  0.057  0.044  0.056  0.044  0.036  0.042  0.178  0.187  0.179  0.160  0.155  0.159 
                                      
Banks  -0.011  0.005     -0.007  -0.001     -0.024  -
0.007***     -0.024**  -0.006***    
   (0.068)  (0.006)     (0.009)  (0.001)     (0.019)  (0.002)     (0.011)  (0.001)    
     x GDP per capita (log)  0.002        0.001        0.002        0.003       
   (0.009)        (0.001)        (0.003)        (0.002)       
     x External Dependence     0.005        -0.000        0.006        0.004    
      (0.010)        (0.001)        (0.005)        (0.002)    
Banks x small        0.003        -0.001        -0.006**        -0.004** 
         (0.007)        (0.001)        (0.003)        (0.002) 
Banks x medium        0.001        -0.002*        -0.006*        -0.004** 
         (0.006)        (0.001)        (0.003)        (0.002) 
Banks x large        0.011        -0.002*        -0.003        -0.002 
         (0.009)        (0.001)        (0.004)        (0.002) 
N  17,708  10,070  17,708  17,883  10,166  17,883  17,544  9,973  17,544  17,690  10,050  17,690 
# countries  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
Adj. R-squared  0.056  0.045  0.057  0.045  0.037  0.044  0.181  0.185  0.179  0.164  0.159  0.162 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                  
Regressions control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being 
publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry 
dummies. Regressions with external dependence interaction term also include unreported level effect. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
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Table 4 Panel B: Asset share and access to finance – cross-country and cross-firm heterogeneity, Partial Effects 
 
   Access to Finance  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
GDP per capita (log) at:  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75 
   b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
NBFI, low-end  -0.006  -0.053**  -0.113***  0.005***  0.002  -0.002  0.005  -0.008  -0.023  0.006**  0.001  -0.003 
   (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.016)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.351***  -0.351***  -0.351***  0.022*  0.022*  0.022*  0.103***  0.103***  0.103***  0.118***  0.118***  0.118*** 
   (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
NBFI, specialized  -0.011  -0.003  0.007  -0.002  -0.001  0.002  0.007  0.006**  0.006  0.006  0.004  0.001 
   (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.221***  -0.221***  -0.221***  0.023**  0.023**  0.023**  0.115***  0.115***  0.115***  0.112***  0.112***  0.112*** 
   (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.078)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Banks  0.001  0.003  0.005  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.008**  -0.006**  -0.004  -0.007***  -0.004**  -0.001 
   (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.227***  -0.227***  -0.227***  0.022**  0.022**  0.022**  0.124***  0.124***  0.124***  0.116***  0.116***  0.116*** 
   (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
                             Access to Finance  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
External dependence at:  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75 
   b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
NBFI, low-end  -0.025  -0.028  -0.031  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001  0  -0.002  0.008**  0.007**  0.006 
   (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
External dependence  -0.114***  -0.114***  -0.114***  0.043***  0.043***  0.043***  0.062*  0.062*  0.062*  0.063***  0.063***  0.063*** 
   (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
NBFI, specialized  0  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.006***  0.006***  0.006**  0.004**  0.004**  0.003** 
   (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
External dependence  -0.156*  -0.156*  -0.156*  0.047***  0.047***  0.047***  0.059  0.059  0.059  0.066**  0.066**  0.066** 
   (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.086)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Banks  0.005  0.006  0.006  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001*  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.005  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.005*** 
   (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
External dependence  -0.184*  -0.184*  -0.184*  0.045***  0.045***  0.045***  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.063**  0.063**  0.063** 
   (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                               26 
 
Table reports partial effects of ordinary least square regressions that control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, dummy variables for 
size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the 
percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. Regressions with external dependence interaction 
term also include unreported level effect. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   27 
 
Table 5: Average size and access to finance 
   Access to 
Finance  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
   oprobit  probit  probit  probit 
   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
NBFI, low-end  -0.594***  -0.707***  0.007  -0.191** 
   (0.150)  (0.152)  (0.206)  (0.094) 
N  18,403  18,641  18,237  18,444 
# countries  36  36  36  36 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared  0.018  0.074  0.110  0.107 
              
NBFI, specialized  0.996  1.091  2.984***  1.153*** 
   (0.634)  (0.736)  (0.816)  (0.407) 
N  17,794  17,997  17,565  17,798 
# countries  33  33  33  33 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared  0.018  0.060  0.133  0.106 
              
Banks  -0.039  -0.013  0.143  0.019 
   (0.110)  (0.088)  (0.099)  (0.051) 
N  22,252  22,553  21,982  22,353 
# countries  50  50  50  50 
Pseudo Adj. R-squared  0.017  0.050  0.104  0.107 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, 
dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the 
firm being publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign 
investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in 
years as well as industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise 
Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
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Table 6 Panel A: Average size and access to finance – cross-country and cross-firm heterogeneity 
   Access to Finace  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
   OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
   coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se  coef/se 
NBFI, low-end  -42.776**  -0.793***     3.633  -0.107***     15.722*  -0.056     15.354**  -0.135***    
   (16.079)  (0.212)     (4.681)  (0.017)     (8.218)  (0.069)     (7.115)  (0.036)    
     x GDP per capita (log)  4.975**        -0.440        -1.859*        -1.824**       
   (1.901)        (0.553)        (0.974)        (0.842)       
     x External Dependence     0.164        -0.015        -0.075        0.092**    
      (0.147)        (0.014)        (0.073)        (0.037)    
NBFI, low-end x small        -0.839***        -0.093***        0.085        0.007 
         (0.181)        (0.020)        (0.074)        (0.039) 
NBFI, low-end x medium        -0.598***        -0.091***        -0.036        -0.071* 
         (0.202)        (0.014)        (0.074)        (0.038) 
NBFI, low-end x large        -0.752***        -0.079***        -0.029        -0.134*** 
         (0.223)        (0.013)        (0.074)        (0.033) 
N  18,403  10,283  18,403  18,646  10,398  18,646  18,240  10,173  18,240  18,449  10,282  18,449 
# countries  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36  36 
Adj. R-squared  0.055  0.047  0.052  0.037  0.040  0.036  0.146  0.150  0.143  0.142  0.140  0.139 
                                      
NBFI, specialized  -6.058  0.895     0.925  0.165     2.584  0.867***     3.213  0.431**    
   (10.011)  (0.848)     (1.805)  (0.102)     (3.452)  (0.264)     (2.572)  (0.167)    
     x GDP per capita (log)  0.890        -0.100        -0.201        -0.340       
   (1.266)        (0.216)        (0.414)        (0.309)       
     x External Dependence     1.110        -0.116        -0.088        -0.094    
      (0.701)        (0.078)        (0.236)        (0.149)    
NBFI, specialized x small        1.163        0.131        1.066***        0.521*** 
         (0.830)        (0.106)        (0.285)        (0.161) 
NBFI, specialized x medium        1.435        0.091        0.968***        0.438** 
         (0.850)        (0.079)        (0.275)        (0.165) 29 
 
NBFI, specialized x large        1.087        0.068        0.578**        0.178 
         (1.005)        (0.077)        (0.248)        (0.123) 
N  17,794  10,131  17,794  18,002  10,235  18,002  17,568  10,005  17,568  17,803  10,119  17,803 
# countries  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33  33 
Adj. R-squared  0.054  0.041  0.053  0.030  0.032  0.029  0.167  0.175  0.168  0.139  0.141  0.138 
                                      
Banks  -2.394*  -0.073     0.519**  -0.002     -0.499  0.030     0.132  -0.004    
   (1.378)  (0.145)     (0.225)  (0.016)     (0.688)  (0.037)     (0.373)  (0.022)    
     x GDP per capita (log)  0.281*        -0.062**        0.066        -0.015       
   (0.161)        (0.027)        (0.082)        (0.044)       
     x External Dependence     0.040        -0.021**        -0.053**        -0.023    
      (0.039)        (0.009)        (0.021)        (0.023)    
Banks x small        -0.093        0.012        0.086**        0.034* 
         (0.140)        (0.015)        (0.037)        (0.020) 
Banks x medium        -0.014        -0.009        0.047        0.009 
         (0.138)        (0.011)        (0.036)        (0.019) 
Banks x large        -0.050        -0.012        0.007        -0.023 
         (0.143)        (0.009)        (0.030)        (0.017) 
N  22,252  11,734  22,252  22,563  11,869  22,563  21,985  11,587  21,985  22,359  11,751  22,359 
# countries  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50  50 
Adj. R-squared  0.060  0.043  0.053  0.039  0.037  0.030  0.139  0.150  0.139  0.139  0.148  0.140 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressions control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, dummy variables for size (medium and large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being publicly 
listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. 
Regressions with external dependence interaction term also include unreported level effect. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   
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Table 6 Panel B: Average size and access to finance – cross-country and cross-firm heterogeneity, Partial effects 
   Access to Finance  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
GDP per capita (log) at:  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75 
   mx2  mx3  mx4  mx6  mx7  mx8  mx10  mx11  mx12  mx14  mx15  mx16 
   b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
NBFI, low-end  -11.811***  -6.103***  -1.168***  0.893  0.388  -0.049  4.150*  2.016*  0.172*  4.003**  1.910**  0.101 
   (4.250)  (2.073)  (0.263)  (1.238)  (0.603)  (0.056)  (2.158)  (1.042)  (0.101)  (1.876)  (0.911)  (0.082) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.118  0.118  0.118  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.015  0.015  0.015  0.011  0.011  0.011 
   (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.049) 
NBFI, specialized  0.052  0.5  1.316  0.238  0.188  0.096  1.203*  1.102**  0.917***  0.880*  0.674**  0.397*** 
   (1.485)  (0.983)  (0.893)  (0.330)  (0.226)  (0.075)  (0.650)  (0.464)  (0.250)  (0.462)  (0.286)  (0.123) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.235***  -0.235***  -0.235***  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.058  0.058  0.058  0.071**  0.071**  0.071** 
   (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Banks  -0.696*  -0.325  -0.067  0.141**  0.058**  0.001  -0.102  -0.015  0.045  0.043  0.024  0.01 
   (0.419)  (0.231)  (0.148)  (0.063)  (0.028)  (0.010)  (0.196)  (0.091)  (0.035)  (0.106)  (0.049)  (0.019) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.119**  0.119**  0.119**  0.091***  0.091***  0.091*** 
   (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.125)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
                             Access to Finance  Account  Overdraft  Loan 
External dependence at:  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75  p25  p50  p75 
   b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se  b/se 
NBFI, low-end  -0.780***  -0.771***  -0.748***  -0.108***  -0.109***  -0.111***  -0.062  -0.066  -0.077  -0.128***  -0.122***  -0.109*** 
   (0.214)  (0.217)  (0.224)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.073)  (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
External dependence  -0.159  -0.159  -0.159  0.040***  0.040***  0.040***  0.043  0.043  0.043  0.054**  0.054**  0.054** 
   (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
NBFI, specialized  0.984  1.095  1.206  0.156  0.144  0.133  0.860***  0.851***  0.842***  0.424***  0.414***  0.405*** 
   (0.857)  (0.873)  (0.894)  (0.100)  (0.098)  (0.096)  (0.266)  (0.271)  (0.278)  (0.163)  (0.159)  (0.157) 
External dependence  -0.135  -0.135  -0.135  0.043***  0.043***  0.043***  0.053  0.053  0.053  0.058**  0.058**  0.058** 
   (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Banks  -0.069  -0.067  -0.061  -0.004  -0.005  -0.008  0.025  0.022  0.015  -0.006  -0.008  -0.011 
   (0.145)  (0.144)  (0.144)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019) 
External dependence  -0.137  -0.137  -0.137  0.055***  0.055***  0.055***  0.061  0.061  0.061  0.063**  0.063**  0.063** 
   (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table reports partial effects of ordinary least square regressions that control for the unreported variables log of GDP per capita, dummy variables for size (medium and 
large), the firm being a subsidiary, the firm being publicly listed, the percentage of the firm owned by foreign investors, the percentage of the firm owned by the state, 
and the firm age in years as well as industry dummies. Regressions with external dependence interaction term also include unreported level effect. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level. 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports, Enterprise Surveys, and WDI as described in the text.   31 
 
Appendix 1 
   Asset Share     Mean Assets in bn USD (constant)       
Country  low-end 
NBFI 
specialized 
NFBI  Banks     low-end 
NBFI 
specialized 




Belarus                    0.430     273 
Benin                    0.115     150 
Bolivia  15.12  0.34  84.54     0.024  0.021  0.410     613 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  2.19  3.24  94.58     0.003  0.039  0.099     361 
Botswana  0.55  12.47  86.98     0.001  0.156  0.511     342 
Brazil  0.83  5.52  93.64     0.003  0.180  2.668     1802 
Bulgaria                 0.017  0.665     288 
Burkina Faso  21.77  3.24  74.99     0.001  0.010  0.100     394 
Cameroon  4.66  10.64  84.70                 363 
Chile  0.45  1.52  98.03     0.004  0.355  2.481     1017 
Colombia  0.74  38.08  61.17     0.024  0.327  0.931     1000 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.51  3.73  94.76                 526 
Croatia              0.026     1.054     633 
Czech Republic                    1.356     250 
Ecuador  4.78  5.89  89.32     0.009  0.013  0.217     658 
Gabon  5.49  5.01  89.49     0.005  0.010  0.187     179 
Georgia                    0.029     373 
Ghana  3.35  4.34  92.31     0.000  0.004  0.129     494 
Guatemala                 0.016  0.385     522 
Guinea-Bissau                    0.010     159 
Honduras  6.31  1.67  92.02     0.072  0.006  0.174     436 
Hungary  6.01  11.79  82.21     0.015  0.034  1.325     291 
Kazakhstan                 0.016  0.093     544 
Kenya  17.09  3.09  79.82     0.000  0.042  0.127     657 
Kyrgyz 
Republic              0.000     0.016     235 
Latvia  0.06  6.07  93.87     0.000  0.040  0.616     271 
Macedonia, 
FYR  1.27  1.51  97.21     0.003  0.005  0.147     366 
Madagascar  5.33  0.27  94.40     0.007  0.002  0.171     445 
Malawi  2.88  1.97  95.15     0.000  0.007  0.060     150 
Mali                    0.138     490 
Mauritius  0.68  5.20  94.12     0.022  0.160  0.396     398 
Moldova              0.000     0.027     363 
Mongolia  0.79  3.49  95.73     0.000  0.000  0.086     362 
Montenegro              0.008     0.050     116 
Mozambique  2.64  14.21  83.15     0.008  0.075  0.225     479 
Namibia              0.000     0.565     329 
Niger                    0.041     150 
Paraguay  11.43  7.86  80.71     0.001  0.012  0.137     613 32 
 
Peru  3.39  4.36  92.25     0.018  0.086  1.239     632 
Philippines  10.34  3.15  86.51     0.007  0.023  1.274     1326 
Poland              0.010     1.886     455 
Rwanda  5.96  23.35  70.69                 212 
Senegal  2.05  0.65  97.30                 506 
Serbia                 0.011  0.145     388 
Sierra Leone                    0.024     150 
Slovak 
Republic                    1.584     275 
Tajikistan              0.000     0.032     360 
Tanzania  0.89  7.06  92.05     0.000  0.013  0.109     419 
Togo                    0.064     155 
Turkey  1.94  3.03  95.03     0.818  0.033  3.464     1152 
Uganda  0.98  4.33  94.68     0.000  0.008  0.078     563 
Ukraine  0.64  0.46  98.89     0.000  0.002  0.133     851 
Uruguay  1.66  15.13  83.21     0.070  0.181  0.833     621 
Zambia  1.03  2.64  96.33     0.000  0.003  0.059     484 
                           25641 
 
Source: Authors' analysis based on data from FSAP reports and Enterprise Surveys as described in the 
text.   
 